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Abstract
Black, Hispanic and White participant-jurors read a murder trial transcript in
which the defendant belonged to either one of the other racial/ethnic groups (outgroup) or
their own racial/ethnic group (ingroup). In the two-verdict condition, participants were
provided with two verdict options: guilty or not guilty. In the three-verdict condition,
participant-jurors were provided with three verdict options: guilty of second-degree
murder (primary charge), guilty of voluntary manslaughter (lesser charge) or not guilty.
In all conditions, participants provided their verdict preference, verdict certainty, the
defendant’s likelihood of guilt and the strength of evidence. Participants in the twoverdict condition indicated higher proportions of conviction for the primary charge
(second-degree murder) than those in the three-verdict condition. No difference was
observed when the analysis examined rates of conviction for both second-degree murder
and voluntary manslaughter, combined. Outgroup defendants received significantly less
proportions of guilt, of the primary charge, in the three-verdict condition.
Keywords: Jury decision-making, verdict options, lesser charge, defendant group status
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Effects of Defendant Group Status and Inclusion of a Lesser Charge on Participant-Juror
Verdict Preferences
American courtrooms are influenced by racial prejudice. This notion is reflected
in the words of Harper Lee in To Kill a Mockingbird:
In our courts, when it’s a white man’s word against a black man’s the white man
always wins. The one place where a man ought to get a square deal is a court
room, be he any color of the rainbow, but people have a way of carrying their
resentments right into a jury box (Lee, 1960, p. 220).
While the severity of racial bias in modern legal matters is less prominent than in the
1930’s when Lee wrote those words, racial bias is undoubtedly still evident in the
courtroom. The decrease of bias is in part attributable to the increase of legislation and
judicial rulings that prohibit such discrimination, however, jurors do not always abide by
the law. Disregard for the law may be conscious, unconscious or a combination of both.
Regardless of cognitive awareness, current psychological research on racial bias in the
legal system has focused on juror bias and the influence it has on jury decision-making.
Racial Bias in Jury Decision-Making
A handful of studies have explored racial bias in the legal system, inclusive of a
meta-analysis conducted by Sweeney and Haney (1992).

This analysis defined

discrimination as disparate treatment of Black defendants, specifically in sentencing
decisions generated by White mock jurors.

The researchers found a minor, but

significant, effect of racial bias across the studies. This significant finding revealed that
White participant-jurors were more likely to provide Black defendants with longer
sentences than White defendants. Mazzella and Feingold (1994) conducted a second

VERDICT OPTIONS AND DEFENDANT GROUP STATUS

5

meta-analysis two years later and provided a different definition than that of Sweeney
and Haney. The definition of racial bias in this analysis was disparate treatment of the
minority (Black) defendant, more specifically, treating an individual differently based on
a specific characteristic, and in the context of this research, race. Overall, Mazzella and
Feingold (1994) did not find a significant effect of racial bias on judgments of guilt or
sentencing decisions. Victim race, however, did appear to influence sentencing decisions
as defendants were given longer sentences for crimes against White victims than against
Black victims (Mazzella & Feingold, 1994). Both meta-analyses suggest juror bias
towards members of a racial outgroup, an individual whose race differs from that of the
mock-juror, either in relation to defendant or victim race.
Following these two analyses, Mitchell, Haw, Pfeifer, and Meissner (2005)
conducted a third review. Unlike the previous reviews, Mitchell et al. (2005) defined
racial bias as “disparate treatment of racial outgroups” as opposed to the previous reviews
that focused on individual minority groups. Taking this definition into consideration, the
review found significant racial outgroup bias in jury decision-making across studies,
consistent with that of Sweeney and Haney (1992) and Mazzella and Feingold (1994).
Therefore, over the thirteen years of research conducted between the first and last metaanalyses mentioned, the presence of juror bias towards members of a racial outgroup has
been evident. This finding reveals the consistency of juror bias in the legal system,
especially in regards to race.
The consistency of racial bias is evident even when the defendant’s race varies.
Despite a majority of research conducted on juror racial bias including White jurors and
Black defendants, racial bias is still a prominent issue when the defendant’s race is one
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other than African American. Research on other minority defendant races, as victims of
juror racial bias, is limited but studies that have been conducted support the concept of
juror racial bias.

For example, Esqueda, Espinoza, and Culhane (2008) found that

European American participant-jurors rendered more guilty verdicts, with longer
sentences, for Mexican American defendants compared to European American
defendants (Esqueda, Espinoza, & Culhane, 2008). This finding supports the idea that
juror racial bias is prominent towards Mexican American defendants, like juror racial
bias towards Blacks.
Despite the stable presence of racial bias towards minority defendants, there is no
sole explanation for it. Researchers are increasingly aware of the presence of juror racial
bias but this awareness does not extend to jurors, as many individuals are not cognitively
aware of their racial biases, especially in context of legal decisions and responsibilities
that coincide with serving as a juror (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004). Jurors may recognize
that race is a significant factor in the trial they are serving on but they may not be
consciously aware of their own personal attitudes towards race (Dovidio & Gaertner,
2004). One possible explanation for this individual lack of awareness is aversive racism
theory. This theory argues that many White Americans harbor unconscious negative
stereotypes towards minority groups, more specifically, African Americans.

On a

conscious level, however, White Americans deem themselves to be fair-minded and
unprejudiced (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004). Despite White American’s beliefs that they
are not prejudiced, their unconscious stereotypes support the contrary. The unconscious
stereotypes seep into the decision-making process and evolve into juror racial bias.
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Just as unconscious stereotypes seep into the decision-making process, evaluative
biases do the same. Evaluative biases constitute an individual harboring prejudices or
developing stereotypes towards another based on their evaluation of them, whether it be
in regards to their physical appearance or behavior (Dovido, Kawakami, and Gaertner,
2002). Similar to negative stereotypes, individuals are not consciously aware of their
evaluative biases and as a result, these biases have been found to influence both social
and legal decisions (Graham & Lowery, 2004) even when explicit bias does not
(McConnell & Leibold, 2001). An example of these evaluative biases is demonstrated in
Dovido et al., (2002), who explored implicit racial associations and explicit racial
attitudes, and the relationship between these and White persons’ behaviors in interracial
interactions. More specifically, response latency and self-report measures were utilized to
predict bias and perceptions of bias in both verbal and non-verbal behavior demonstrated
by Whites as they interacted with a Black peer. Results demonstrated that the selfreported racial attitudes were a significant predictor of bias in verbal behavior towards
Blacks in comparison to other Whites. Results also indicated that implicit biases were
likely to impact affective impressions of minority individuals and interpretations of their
non-verbal behavior (Dovido et al., 2002). Both racial attitudes and implicit biases could
contribute to juror racial bias towards outgroup defendants, especially when a defendant’s
race is a salient factor in a criminal trial.
The previously mentioned concepts of negative stereotypes and explicit racial
attitudes contribute to juror racial bias and subsequently, influence juror attitudes toward
verdicts and punishment (Miller & Vidmar, 1981). Jurors provide punishments as they
strive to protect society and uphold justice norms that are violated by the defendant
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(Carlsmith, 2006; Darley & Pittman, 2003), or in the case of the present study, issue
guilty verdicts.

A consequence of laypeople providing such punishments, or guilty

verdicts, is that their punitive responses can be affected by social factors that are
irrelevant to the legal matters of the trial. More specifically, research has demonstrated
that jurors often provide different judgments for defendants from their own community
than for those of an outside community, referred to as ingroup and outgroup defendants
respectively (Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997; Vidmar, 2002).
In some circumstances, jurors strive to provide harsher punishments for outgroup
defendants while other times they desire the ingroup defendant to endure more severe
punishments (Kerr, Hymes, Anderson, & Weathers, 1995). Graham, Weiner, and Zucker
(1997) conducted a study where individuals wanted an outgroup defendant to endure
harsher punishments. The study investigated American’s reactions to the O.J. Simpson
trial. Results revealed that African Americans recommended less severe punishments for
the defendant than did their White counterparts. Outgroup discrimination was also
demonstrated by Leippe and his colleagues (Leippe, Bergold & Eisenstadt, 2017; Leippe,
Gettings, Despodova & Eisenstaft, 2016). In this study, Black, Hispanic and White
participant-jurors read a trial transcript where the defendant was either an ingroup or
outgroup member. Among all participant groups, outgroup defendants were more likely
to be judged as guilty.

The findings support the presence of juror racial bias and

demonstrate the influence juror bias can have on the process of jury decision-making,
more specifically, the duty of rendering verdicts.
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Multiple Verdict Options.
Despite juror racial bias that may be present during the process of jury decisionmaking, the most important part of the process is the jury’s duty to reach a verdict on
behalf of the defendant. Traditionally, jurors are presented with two verdict options:
guilty or not guilty. According to research, however, dichotomous verdict options are
frustrating to juries and they have expressed preference for an alternative verdict
(Barbato, 2005). Limited research has been conducted in regards to multiple verdict
options and the influence their presence would have on the process of jury decisionmaking. This study aims to contribute to that literature.
Savitsky and Lindblom (1986) conducted a study to explore the influence of
multiple verdict options. This study presented participant-jurors with varying verdict
options across conditions. In addition to the traditional dichotomous verdict options of
guilty or not guilty, participants were also presented with not guilty by reason of insanity
(NGRI) and guilty but mentally ill (GBMI). More specifically, one condition included
guilty or not guilty, the second condition presented the dichotomous verdict options with
the addition of NGRI and the third condition included all four verdict options: guilty, not
guilty, NGRI and GBMI. The results demonstrated that the presence of multiple verdict
options had a significant impact on juror verdict decisions, with GBMI drawing many
verdict preferences, and as a result, increasing the total proportion of guilty verdict
preferences (Savitsky & Lindblom, 1986).
Another verdict that is an attractive choice to jurors is the Not Proven (NP) option
utilized in Scottish law. Hope et al. (2008) found that jurors were inclined to reach a NP
verdict instead of not guilty when the third option was offered (Hope et al., 2008). While
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the results from Hope et al. (2008) address multiple verdict options, the American legal
system does not employ the Not Proven verdict option. In order to further explore the
influence of additional verdict options, despite the absence of the Not Proven verdict
option in the American legal system, Smithson, Deady and Gracik (2007) conducted a
study to compare the NP verdict with a verdict utilized in our legal system: one of a
lesser charge. It was thought by researchers that the NP verdict would deter jurors from
yielding convictions but results demonstrated that NP more often replaced outright
acquittals (Smithson et al., 2007).
Koch and Devine (1999) conducted a study with a verdict option more applicable
to the American legal system. Researchers examined a lesser charge verdict option but
they did not compare it to another third verdict option as Smithson et al. (2007) did.
Instead, Koch and Devine (1999) compared a two-verdict option condition, inclusive of
guilty or not guilty, to a three-verdict option condition, inclusive of guilty of the primary
charge, guilty of a lesser charge and not guilty. Researchers hypothesized that the
inclusion of the lesser charge may increase the probability of conviction, at the expense
of decreasing the defendant’s punishment severity. The hypothesis was supported as
results revealed that jurors in the three-verdict condition produced more convictions than
those in the two-verdict condition. These results also supported the idea that the presence
of multiple verdict options influences juror verdict outcomes; more specifically, that
jurors will be more likely to convict when a lesser charge verdict is available.
A possible theory for jurors’ increased likelihood to convict when a lesser charge
verdict is available is the compromise effect. Simonson (1989) states that an alternative
or third option is more likely to be selected when it becomes a compromise or middle
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option in the set of choices. The third verdict option of a lesser charge is essentially a
middle option between the set of choices inclusive of guilty of the primary charge, guilty
of a lesser charge or not guilty. Theoretically, the addition of guilty of a lesser charge as
a third verdict option should have the most influence in cases where the strength of
evidence against the defendant is only moderately strong as a lesser charge is reserved for
situations where jurors have doubt in regards to the defendant’s guilt and the prosecution
has failed to fulfill their responsibility proving guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
The compromise effect suggests that framing choices for individuals matters as
the presence or absence of additional options will influence the final outcome (Larsen,
2011).

Therefore, in terms of decision-making processes, this theory suggests that

framing verdict options, with the addition of multiple verdict options, will influence
jurors’ final verdict outcome. One study with findings that support this effect is Kelman,
Rottenstreich, and Tversky (1996). In the study, participant-jurors read a case summary
with possible verdicts that consisted of: special circumstances murder, murder, voluntary
manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter. Participants were divided into two groups,
the lower set group, which eliminated the special circumstances murder verdict, and the
upper set group, which eliminated the involuntary manslaughter verdict.
In the lower set group, more than 50% of jurors chose voluntary manslaughter,
the middle choice verdict, and 39% chose the most severe verdict of murder. In the upper
set group, 57% chose murder, the middle choice verdict, and only 31% chose voluntary
manslaughter, the least severe verdict (Kelman et al., 1996).

From these results,

researchers concluded that a verdict option does better when it is the middle choice of the
set presented, demonstrating how more extreme options on either side of the intermediate
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charge cause jurors to compromise among verdict choices (Kelman et al., 1996). These
findings show, by support of the compromise effect, how the presence of three verdict
options influences juror verdict outcomes and how jurors will likely opt for the middle
verdict. The findings also provide implications for the process of jury decision-making,
more specifically, verdicts presented to jurors and their influence on verdict outcomes.
Why Defendant Group Status Might Matter When Verdict Options Increase
As previously discussed, it is evident that juror racial bias is a prominent issue in
jury decision-making (Sweeney & Haney, 1992; Mazzella & Feingold, 1994; Mitchell et
al., 2005). Furthermore, jurors harbor negative stereotypes and racial attitudes towards
outgroup defendants and those negative emotions are correlated with increased guilty
verdicts (Miller & Vidmar, 1981). Research has also revealed that the presence of
multiple verdict options, instead of the traditional dichotomous verdict options,
influences the verdict outcomes (Hope et al., 2008) as jurors tended to find additional
verdict options appealing, especially when they experienced frustration with the
dichotomous verdict options in situations where the prosecution did not fulfill its
obligation to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (Savitsky & Lindblom, 1986; Hope
et al., 2008; Barbato, 2005).

Since previous research shows increased outgroup

discrimination (Sweeney & Haney, 1992; Esqueda et al., 2008) and ingroup leniency
(Leippe, 2017; Mitchell et al, 2005; Vidmar, 2002), and the presence of multiple verdict
options to be appealing (Hope et al., 2008), it is possible that participant-jurors in the
three-verdict condition, where they are presented with both a primary and lesser charge
verdict option, might indicate higher proportions of guilt for the primary charge (seconddegree murder) for outgroup defendants and higher proportions of guilt for the lesser
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charge (voluntary manslaughter) for ingroup defendants, demonstrating a shift from the
primary to the lesser charge for ingroup defendants only.
Study Overview
The current study aims to explore the interaction between defendant group status
and verdict options and how the two variables influence mock-juror verdict outcomes,
more specifically, the rates of conviction when participant-jurors are presented with twoverdict options versus three-verdict options and how the manipulation of the defendant
group status will moderate that effect. Previous research has supported the presence of
juror racial bias in the process of jury decision-making with much of the literature
focusing on bias that victimizes outgroup defendants and provides more leniency towards
ingroup defendants (Graham, Weiner, & Zucker, 1997; Leippe et al., 2017). I expected
similar results in that outgroup defendants would experience higher rates of juror racial
bias and, as a result, would receive more guilty verdicts than ingroup defendants. In
terms of multiple verdict options, I expected that participant-jurors would render more
overall guilty verdicts in the three-verdict condition than the two-verdict condition, due
primarily to the compromise effect (Simonson, 1989; Kelman et al., 1996) and the
presence of a lesser charge verdict increasing the proportions of guilt, at the expense of
decreasing the defendant’s punishment severity (Koch & Devine, 1999). Overall, I
expected that participant-jurors, in the three-verdict condition, would render increased
proportions of guilty verdict preferences and that this relationship would be stronger
when the defendant was an outgroup member compared to an ingroup member.
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Method
Participants and Design
A total of 108 undergraduate students at an urban university in the Northeast
participated in this study, ranging in age from 18 to 38 (M = 21.17, SD = 4.36). The
sample varied in ethnicity with 23.9% Caucasian, 11.9% African American, 51.4%
Hispanic and 12.8% of participants who identified as “Other”. The sample consisted of
75.2% female and 24.8% male. Participants who identified as a race/ethnicity other than
White, Black or Hispanic were permitted to participate, however, their race was recorded
as “Other” and their data were excluded from analysis. Participants’ data were also
excluded if they were not at least 18 years old or if they failed the manipulation check.
Participants were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (verdict condition:
two- or three-verdict options) x 3 (defendant race/ethnicity: White, Black or Hispanic)
factorial design. Given this design, the defendant’s race/ethnicity was either the same as
(ingroup defendant) or different than (outgroup defendant) that of the participant-juror.
The factorial design simplified to a 2 (verdict condition: two- or three-verdict options) x 2
(defendant group status: ingroup or outgroup) design.
Procedure
Participants were seated at a computer station and advised they would be reading
a criminal trial transcript. Initial forms were completed, including the informed consent
(Appendix A) and demographic questionnaire (Appendix B).

Included on the

demographic questionnaire was a question regarding which race/ethnicity the participant
identified with: Asian, African American, Hispanic, White or Other. Upon completion,
instructions were read to the participant-jurors stating that after they read the trial
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transcript, they would be asked to render a verdict preference and complete and
individual juror questionnaire. Further instruction was presented on the computer screen.
These instructions stated the study was sponsored by the Department of Justice,
accompanied by the insignia of the DOJ, and was interested in “reasoning and decisionmaking by adults who are eligible to serve as jurors,” that it was likely the “research
findings will have real-world impact,” that the transcript was from a real case, and that
the actual verdict decision and its accuracy were known (Appendix C).
Participants independently continued the experiment on the computer through a
MediaLab presentation that began with a brief summary of the case, that identified the
race/ethnicity of the defendant, and photographs and names of five trial participants (the
judge, attorneys, eyewitnesses and defendant).

The defendant was Black, White or

Hispanic while the other four were White. Participants were then presented with the trial
transcript, inclusive of the judge’s preliminary (Appendix D) and final instructions
(Appendix E) and the dependent measures (Appendix F), inclusive of rendering their
verdict preference and certainty, the defendant’s likelihood of guilt, and the strength of
trial evidence for the defendant’s guilt and innocence. Once participants completed
reading the trial transcript, they read the judge’s final instructions. Participant-jurors in
the two-verdict condition read, “Before you provide your verdict, I want to define the
elements of the charge against the defendant. The state has charged the defendant with
Felony Murder, a Second-Degree Murder offense,” this was followed by a full definition
and statement of the minimum sentence duration.
Participant-jurors in the three-verdict condition read the same definition of and
minimum sentence duration for second-degree murder, in addition to, “I am submitting
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for your consideration the offense of Voluntary Manslaughter. That crime is called a
lesser included offense of Second-Degree Murder” and “the difference of intent is a
mitigating factor that reduces what otherwise would be Second-Degree Murder to
Voluntary Manslaughter.” A statement of the definition and minimum sentence duration
for voluntary manslaughter followed this. After reading the judge’s final instructions,
participant-jurors indicated their verdict preference and other dependent measures,
answered the manipulation check (Appendix G), and were fully debriefed (Appendix H).
Materials and Manipulations
Trial transcript and judge’s instructions. The transcript outlined the trial of a
robbery/murder case involving a robbery at knifepoint that escalated into a fatal stabbing.
An eyewitness observed the events from his second story window. Participants were
enlightened of what allegedly occurred after reading the initial statements of the
prosecution’s opening arguments.

The transcript consisted of excerpts from the

(fictional) trial, inclusive of the judge’s opening instructions, opening and closing
arguments from both the prosecution and defense, direct and cross-examination of the
eyewitness, and other witnesses, police investigators, and the defendant. A photograph of
the respective trial participant, as previously shown with the case summary, accompanied
each trial excerpt. The trial transcript was concluded with the judge’s final instructions to
the jury.
The judge’s opening instructions advised the participants that the defendant is
being charged with murder in the second degree and proceeds to outline the definition of
felony murder, as well as the minimum prison sentence. The instructions also inform the
participants of the definition of “intent,” (included in the definition of felony murder) and
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the definition of the term, “proof beyond a reasonable doubt,” advising that participantjurors must be firmly convinced of the defendant’s guilt and have no reasonable doubt of
the crime or the defendant’s identity as the person who committed the crime.
The judge’s final instructions are modified to be consistent with the verdict
options presented to participant-jurors. The two-verdict condition instructions advise
participant-jurors it is their responsibility to decide on the credibility of the witnesses, the
importance of their testimony, and indicate their verdict preference. The definitions of
second-degree murder and burden of proof are reiterated, as well as the minimum prison
sentence, if the defendant is found guilty. The three-verdict condition instructions advise
participant-jurors of the same information as the two-verdict condition instructions, with
the inclusion of the consideration of voluntary manslaughter, presented as a lesser offense
of second-degree murder.

The instructions include a definition of voluntary

manslaughter, followed by a minimum prison sentence, how the difference of intent is a
mitigating factor that would reduce what would be considered second-degree murder to
voluntary manslaughter, and an advisement that participant-jurors can find the defendant
not guilty of both charges or guilty of one of the two charges.
Dependent measures. Participants were first asked to “indicate the verdict they
prefer.” Participant-jurors in the two-verdict condition could check either “guilty” or
“not guilty” while those in the three-verdict condition could check either “guilty: seconddegree murder,” “guilty: voluntary manslaughter” or “not guilty.” Participants in the
two-verdict condition then provided their verdict certainty on an 11-point scale (1 =
Extremely uncertain, 11 = Extremely certain), rated the likelihood the defendant
committed the primary charge (second-degree murder, on a scale ranging from 0% to
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100%, in 5% increments) and the strength of evidence for the defendant’s guilt and
innocence, for second-degree murder, both on 11-point scales (1 = Not at all strong, 11 =
Extremely strong).
Participants in the three-verdict condition completed the dependent measures
listed above, and in addition, rated the lesser charge (voluntary manslaughter) on the
same likelihood and strength of evidence scales used for the primary charge. Then
participants in the three-verdict condition responded to an open-ended question that asked
them to list the reasons they rendered the verdict that they did. Finally, participants in all
conditions completed a manipulation check that asked participant-jurors to indicate the
defendant’s race/ethnicity by circling a race/ethnicity from a list of options.
Results
Defendant Race Manipulation Check
Of the 108 participants, 98 participants were administered a manipulation check,
92 (93.9%) of whom correctly recalled the race of the defendant. The data of the six
participants who incorrectly answered the manipulated check were excluded from all data
analyses. Twelve participants’ data were also excluded as they identified as a race other
than Black, White or Hispanic and one participant was excluded, as they were less than
18 years of age.
Verdict Preferences
Participant-jurors’ verdict preferences in each condition are displayed in Table 1.
The table includes percentages of guilty verdict preferences, for the primary charge alone
and the primary and lesser charge combined, as well as participant-juror perceived
likelihood of guilt and the average ratings of perceived strength of evidence for guilt and
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strength of evidence for innocence, all for the primary charge alone and all for the lesser
charge alone.
Table 1. Percentages and Ratings of Participant-Jurors’ Verdict Preferences
Two-Verdict Conditions
Three-Verdict Conditions
Ingroup
Outgroup
Ingroup
Outgroup
Percent Guilty
(Primary and
59.1
69.2
82.4
66.7
Lesser Charge
Combined)
Percent Guilty
(Primary Charge)

59.1

69.2

58.8

29.2

-

-

41.5

58.5

Likelihood
Of Guilt
(Primary Charge)

70.68

70.57

74.65

57.71

Evidence
For Guilt
(Primary Charge)

6.95

6.77

7.35

5.67

Evidence for
Innocence
(Primary Charge)

5.36

4.38

5.12

4.04

Likelihood
Of Guilt
(Lesser Charge)

-

-

52.41

64.38

Evidence
For Guilt
(Lesser Charge)

-

-

6.18

6.21

Evidence for
Innocence
(Lesser Charge)

-

-

4.82

3.63

Percent Guilty
(Lesser Charge)
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Proportion of guilty verdicts rendered for both charges combined. The first
two chi-square tests of independence were used to determine if verdict condition and
defendant group status yielded a significant difference in the proportion of guilty verdicts
rendered for both second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter combined. The first
test, examining the effects of verdict condition, revealed that participant-jurors in the
two-verdict condition rendered a guilty verdict preference 64.6% of the time, whereas
participant-jurors in the three-verdict condition rendered a guilty verdict preference
73.2% of the time. This difference was not statistically significant, χ2 (1, N = 89) = 0.76,
p = 0.39. The second chi-square test, exploring the effects of defendant group status,
showed that participant-jurors who read a trial transcript with an outgroup defendant
rendered guilty verdicts 68.0% of the time, whereas participant-jurors who read a trial
transcript with an ingroup defendant rendered guilty verdicts 69.2% of the time. The
difference was not statistically significant, χ2 (1, N = 89) = 0.02, p = 0.90.
Proportion of guilty verdicts rendered for the primary charge. The second
set of chi-square tests were conducted to explore whether verdict condition and defendant
group status revealed a significant different in the proportion of guilty verdicts for
second-degree murder (the primary charge) alone. The first chi-square test, examining
the effects of verdict condition, showed that participant-jurors in the two-verdict
condition rendered a guilty preference for second-degree murder 64.6% of the time.
Participant-jurors in the three-verdict condition rendered a guilty preference for seconddegree murder 41.5% of the time. This difference was statistically significant, χ2 (1, N =
89) = 4.76, p < 0.05. The second chi-square test, exploring the effects of defendant group
status, revealed that participant-jurors who read a trial transcript with an outgroup
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defendant indicated guilt of second-degree murder as their preferred verdict 50% of the
time, whereas participant-jurors who read a trial transcript with an ingroup defendant,
indicated guilt of second-degree murder as their preferred verdict 59% of the time. This
difference was not statistically significant, χ2 (1, N = 89) = 0.71, p = 0.40.
To determine if there was an interaction effect of verdict condition and defendant
group status on the proportion of guilty verdicts rendered for both second-degree murder
and voluntary manslaughter combined, a logistic regression of verdict preferences, with
predictors of verdict options, defendant group status, and the interaction of the two
variables, was conducted. The verdict condition that the participant-juror was in did not
significantly predict whether they rendered a guilty verdict, B = 0.85, Wald χ2 (1) = 1.21,
p = 0.27. Defendant group status also did not significantly predict whether a participantjuror rendered a guilty verdict, B = 0.12, Wald χ2 (1) = 0.38, p = 0.85. The effect of
verdict options was not moderated by defendant group status, as the interaction term in
the regression was not significant, B = -1.29, Wald χ2 (1) = 1.73, p = 0.19.
Similarly, to determine if there was an interaction effect between verdict
condition and defendant group status on the proportion of guilty verdicts rendered for the
primary charge only, a logistic regression, with predictors of verdict options, defendant
group status, and the interaction of the two variables, was conducted. Verdict options
significantly predicted whether participant-jurors rendered a guilty verdict, B = 1.70,
Wald χ2 (1) = 7.55, p = 0.006. In the two-verdict condition, 64.6% of the participantjurors judged the defendant guilty of the primary, whereas, in the three-verdict condition,
41.5% did so.

Defendant group status had a near-significant effect on verdict

preferences, such that 59% of the participant-jurors preferred a guilty verdict for the
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ingroup defendant compared to only 50% for the outgroup defendant, B = 1.24, Wald χ2
(1) = 3.48, p = 0.06. The interaction term in the regression was near significant, B = 1.69, Wald χ2 (1) = 3.50, p = 0.06. To understand the interaction, additional chi-square
tests were conducted to examine how defendant status moderated the influence of verdict
options.
The first chi-square test focused on the simple effect of defendant status in the
two-verdict condition. This revealed no effect of defendant status on proportion of guilty
verdicts rendered for the primary charge only (χ2 (1, N = 89) = 0.536, p = 0.46).
Participant-jurors preferred a guilty verdict of the primary charge 59.1% of the time when
the defendant belonged to a outgroup and 69.2% of the time when the defendant
belonged to an ingroup.
The second chi-square test focused on the simple effect of defendant status in the
three-verdict condition. This revealed a near-significant difference such that participantjurors indicated 58.8% guilty verdict preferences for ingroup defendants compared to
29.2% guilty verdicts for outgroup defendants (χ2 (1, N = 89) = 3.61, p = 0.058).
Lastly, a chi-square test was conducted to explore whether verdict condition
influenced verdict preferences for the primary charge when the defendant was an
outgroup member. This revealed a highly significant difference, such that the outgroup
defendants received significantly higher proportions of guilty verdict preferences in the
two-verdict condition (69.2%) compared to the three-verdict condition (29.2%), χ2 (1, N
= 89) = 8.01, p = 0.005.
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Verdict-Relevant Ratings
A series of 2 (verdict condition: two or three) x 2 (group status: ingroup or
outgroup) analyses of variance (ANOVAs) was conducted to examine the scaled
dependent measures relating to the primary charge.
Mock-juror verdict certainty. The ANOVA of verdict certainty scores revealed
no effects that approached significance (all Fs < 1). The overall mean certainty was 7.65.
Likelihood of guilt of the primary charge. The ANOVA of likelihood of guilt
ratings revealed no effects, Fs (1,88) < 2.07, ps > .15.
Evidence strength for the primary charge. The ANOVA of perceived strength
of evidence for guilt of the primary charge revealed no significant main effect of verdict
condition, F (1,88) = 0.40, p = 0.53. There was a marginal main effect of defendant
group status on perceived strength of evidence for guilt, F (1,88) = 2.82, p = 0.10.
Evidence for guilt tended to be seen as stronger when the defendant was an ingroup
member (M = 7.13, SD = 2.40) compared to an outgroup member (M = 6.24, SD = 2.75).
The interaction effect was not significant, F (1,88) = 1.81, p = 0.18.
The ANOVA of perceived strength of evidence for innocence ratings revealed
there was no main effect of verdict options on perceived strength of evidence for
innocence for the primary charge, F (1,88) = 0.35, p = 0.56. There was, however, a
significant main effect of defendant status such that the perceived evidence for innocence
was higher when the defendant was an ingroup member (M = 5.26, SD = 2.31) than when
the defendant was a outgroup member (M = 4.22, SD = 2.30), F (1,88) = 4.23, p < 0.05.
The interaction was not significant, F (1,88) = 0.01, p = 0.92.
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Likelihood of guilt of the lesser charge. A one-way ANOVA of ratings of the
likelihood of guilt, relating to the lesser charge, did not reveal a significant effect of
defendant status, F (1,41) = 1.46, p = 0.23.
Evidence strength for the lesser charge.

One-way ANOVAs of perceived

strength of evidence for guilt and for innocence of the lesser charge, revealed no
significant effects of defendant group status, F (1,41) = 0.001, p = 0.98, and F (1,41) =
2.11, p = 0.15, respectively.
Discussion
The current study aimed to explore how the presence of multiple verdict options,
and the defendant’s group status, as either an ingroup or outgroup member, would
influence mock-juror verdict preferences. In a trial for which the case for conviction was
fairly strong, supported by an eyewitness testimony and a 90% DNA match, proportions
of preference for guilt for the primary charge, in the two-verdict condition, were not
significantly different when the defendant was an outgroup member versus when the
defendant was an ingroup member. In the three-verdict condition, when participantjurors were introduced to an additional verdict option of a lesser charge, a reverse
discrimination effect was observed in the proportions of preference for guilt for the
primary charge, as outgroup defendants but not ingroup defendants, saw a significant
decrease in convictions of second-degree murder. A trend of reverse discrimination was
also observed in ratings of strength of evidence for guilt.

These findings have

implications for the understanding of racial bias in the process of jury decision-making
and generally, who is on the receiving end of the discrimination.
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Defendant Ingroup or Outgroup Status
Juror biases towards members of a racial outgroup, an individual whose race
differs from that of the juror, has been demonstrated in research (Sweeney & Haney,
1992; Mazzella & Feingold, 1994; Mitchell et al., 2005) and has been found to influence
both social and legal decisions (Graham & Lowery, 2004).

The current study

hypothesized that similar trends would be observed. This prediction was not supported.
Interestingly, little to no discrimination, in either direction, was observed in the twoverdict condition. Participant-jurors indicated slightly higher rates of conviction for
outgroup defendants, however, the difference was not significant.

The absence of

discrimination, in the two-verdict condition, concurs with some previous research that
found the manipulation of defendant race did not influence juror decision-making
(McGuire & Bermant, 1977; Bray & Kerr, 1979; Hastie, 1993, Williams & Holcomb,
2001).
Reverse discrimination was found in the three-verdict condition as participantjurors indicated higher rates of conviction for ingroup defendants. Ingroup members
were convicted in more than half of the cases (58.8%) and outgroup defendants in less
than one-third of cases (29.2%).

Some research has indicated support for reverse

discrimination (Foley & Piggott, 2002), especially when jurors seem inclined to appear
politically correct in settings that value egalitarian attitudes (Crosby, Bromley, & Saxe,
1980). Therefore, participant-jurors’ intention to appear politically correct could have
been a moderating factor for decreased proportions of guilty preferences rendered for
outgroup defendants. It is important to note, however, that the current study imposes a
limitation on this interpretation, as it does not seem politically correct to be extra lenient
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towards the White defendants who represented a majority of the outgroup defendants in
this study.
Multiple Verdict Options
Juries have expressed a preference for an alternative verdict, outside of the
traditional dichotomous options (Barbato, 2005) and studies have found the presence of
multiple verdict options to have an impact on verdict decisions (Savitsky & Lindblom,
1986; Koch & Devine, 1999). More specifically, Koch and Devine (1999) found that
participant-jurors in a three-verdict condition, versus a two-verdict condition, produced
more convictions. This finding led to the hypothesis that participant-jurors in the current
study would produce higher proportions of guilty verdicts in the three-verdict condition
compared to the two-verdict condition. Results did not reflect the findings of Koch and
Devine (1999) as participant-jurors did not indicate a significant difference in proportions
of guilty verdict preferences in the three-verdict condition (73.2%) compared to the twoverdict condition (64.6%). Results did, however, support the concept of a shift from the
primary to a lesser charge (Koch & Devine, 1999; Simonson, 1989), as outgroup
defendants saw a significant decrease in convictions of the primary charge in the threeverdict condition.
Multiple Verdict Options and Defendant Ingroup/Outgroup Status
Jurors harbor negative stereotypes and racial attitudes towards outgroup
defendants that are generally correlated with increased proportions of guilty verdicts
(Mitchell et al., 2005; Esqueda et al., 2008) and multiple verdict options are appealing to
jurors, and tend to influence verdict outcomes (Hope et al., 2008). The current study
hypothesized that the two variables would interact and participant-jurors in the three-
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verdict condition would indicate higher proportions of guilt for the primary charge
(second-degree murder) for outgroup defendants and higher proportions of guilt for the
lesser charge (voluntary manslaughter) for ingroup defendants; demonstrating a shift
from the primary to the lesser charge for ingroup defendants. Instead, a shift from the
primary to the lesser charge was found for outgroup defendants as they were convicted of
the primary charge less often in the three-verdict condition (29.2%) than in the twoverdict condition (69.2%). The decrease in proportions of guilt of the primary charge
was replaced with proportions of guilt of the lesser charge (37.5%) and outright acquittals
(33.3%). Interestingly, participant-jurors indicated nearly identical proportions of guilt
for the primary charge for ingroup members in the two-verdict condition (59.1%)
compared to the three-verdict condition (58.8%).
One reason for the higher proportions of guilty verdict preferences for ingroup
defendants, and the shift from the primary to lesser charge for outgroup defendants, may
be explained by the Black Sheep Effect. According to social identity theory (Tajfel &
Turner, 1986) the presence of ingroup favorability stems from a need for positive selfimage and therefore, ingroup members are increasingly motivated to perceive other
ingroup members positively. When an ingroup member is deviant, however, and poses a
threat to that image, ingroup members will discriminate against the ingroup member, in
an effort to distance themselves from the deviant ingroup member and thereby protect
their social identity (Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988; Marques, 1990). Furthermore, in relation
to the current study, research has found that ingroup deviants, such as criminals, may be
perceived as dishonoring the whole group (Lauderdale et al., 1984; Marques, 1990).
Ingroup members may fear the possibility of appearing guilty by association, when the
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defendant shares group membership, and as a result, might respond with increased
punishment severity or proportions of guilty verdict preferences.
Evidence for reverse discrimination was also found in participants’ ratings of the
strength of evidence for guilt. Outgroup defendants were viewed as having weaker
evidence against them compared to ingroup defendants.

Yet, the opposite effect –

outgroup discrimination – was found on strength of case evidence for innocence. Ingroup
defendants received higher ratings of evidence for innocence in both the two- and threeverdict conditions. Although this result is consistent with previous research supporting
ingroup favoritism and outgroup discrimination (Sweeney & Haney, 1992; Mazzella and
Feingold, 1994), it contradicts the reverse discrimination observed on other measures.
One possibility is that participant-jurors were more ambivalent about the evidence when
an ingroup member seemed to be at fault.

Without further research, this result is

otherwise difficult to explain.
Implications
Race, ethnicity and group status of the defendant. Even if the participantjurors in this study favored the outgroup, it is still discrimination and suggests the
presence of racial and ethnic bias in a courtroom setting. There are reasons to be
concerned of the possibility of subconscious racial and ethnic biases infiltrating the
process of juror decision-making and influencing verdict preferences. One reason is
whether jurors are aware of the bias in their verdict preferences. Research has supported
the concept that jurors are not cognitively aware of their racial biases, especially in
context of legal decisions (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004). The utilization of pretrial judge’s
instructions, in an attempt to bring stereotypes to conscious awareness, and to correct for
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outgroup discrimination, might serve as one legal remedy, however, research has found
limited influence of pre-trial instructions on other potential bias factors, inclusive of
pretrial publicity (Kramer, Kerr & Carrol, 1990; Leippe et al., 2017).
Explicitly identifying race as an important aspect of a trial could serve as another
attempt to bring negative racial stereotypes to light. When race is coined as an important
issue in a case, or has been presented as such by legal actors, the trial becomes
characterized as race salient (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2001) and discrimination by Whites
towards Black defendants is observed less frequently (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2001). One
reason for the decrease of discrimination is the aversive racism theory. For example,
many White Americans have unconscious negative stereotypes towards minorities but
consciously, White Americans feel they are fair-minded and not prejudice (Dovidio &
Gaertner, 2004). By identifying race as an important issue, participant-jurors aim to
appear to others as they deem themselves to be: fair-minded and not prejudice, and
therefore, decreasing public discrimination towards Black defendants.
Even when race is salient in a trial, implicit and evaluative biases have been found
to influence both social and legal decisions (Graham & Lowery, 2004) when explicit bias
does not (McConnel & Leibold, 2001). Implicit biases have been found to impact
affective impressions of minority individuals and interpretations of their non-verbal
behavior (Dovido et al., 2002). In trials where defendants’ are present, but may not
present themselves verbally, the defendant might be at an increased risk of outgroup
discrimination from jurors who allow their implicit biases to influence the defendant’s
non-verbal behaviors.
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Overall, it is evident that the need for legal remedies to correct discrimination and
biases is crucial. By continuing to research factors that influence jury decision-making
and verdict preferences, researchers can contribute to a better understanding of varying
social and cognitive processes, both conscious and unconscious, that are experienced
when jurors make both individual and collective decisions in regards to complex trial
information. From such findings, inclusive of those from the current study, policies and
procedures for juries can be adapted. More specifically, judicial instructions can be
adapted to serve as a potential legal remedy against racial bias, whether towards ingroup
or outgroup defendants.
Presentation of additional verdicts. The presence of multiple verdict options
influences juror verdict preferences and impacts conviction rates (Koch & Devine, 1999)
as jurors are drawn to other verdict preferences (Savitsky & Lindblom, 1986), especially
one of a lesser charge. In the current study, the presence of the lesser charge option was
effective in drawing participant-jurors from the primary charge to the lesser charge -- but
only for outgroup defendants. This selective effectiveness of the lesser verdict option
might have been a result of participant-jurors’ striving to appear politically correct and
demonstrate increased leniency towards outgroup defendants by convicting them of the
lesser charge more frequently than the primary charge, when given the option.
Jurors are also drawn to a lesser charge option when the prosecution does not
convince them beyond a reasonable doubt (Simonson, 1989), suggesting that the presence
of a third verdict option is helpful to jurors in the decision-making process. Participantjurors’ responses to the open-ended question in the three-verdict condition, of the current
study, support the idea that a lesser charge option is helpful when they are not convinced

VERDICT OPTIONS AND DEFENDANT GROUP STATUS

31

beyond a reasonable doubt. Some of participant-juror responses included, (1) “I chose
guilty of voluntary manslaughter because it is not fully proven that the defendant meant
to kill Mr. Taylor,” (2) “The burden of proof is on the prosecution and in this case, there
is no concrete indicator that the defendant is guilty of second-degree murder. There are
too many loose ends the prosecution did not sew up,” (3) “DNA was 90% accurate,
leaving 10% for error and if you can’t be 100% exact, then there is a possibility of
innocence,” and (4) “There isn’t much evidence to prove that it was intentional murder.”
The evidence against the defendant in the current study was fairly strong. The
influence of the presence of a lesser verdict option, however, might be the strongest in
trials that have evidence that is only moderately strong. Future research might consider
exploring the effects of strength of trial evidence and multiple verdict options on verdict
preferences and determine if the rates of shifting to a verdict of a lesser charge would be
higher in conditions with moderate strength of evidence compared to those with high
strength of evidence.
Limitations
As with any study conducted with participant-jurors, there are limitations to
generalizing the results to “real world” settings. Participant-jurors consisted solely of
undergraduate students from one institution where a majority of the students pursue
degrees in the fields of psychology and criminal justice, or at least engage in a course that
discusses such topics. Due to this exposure, in addition to the institution’s student body
being relatively diverse, results may not be representative of a “general” population.
Students may have been more knowledgeable of the prevalence of racial bias in society,
more specifically in the criminal justice system, due to educational exposure. In addition,
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the diverse population may have, to a degree, desensitized students to racial bias towards
others. This effect could have influenced participant-jurors to be less likely to convict the
defendant based on their ingroup or outgroup status. Future research should aim to
include a more diverse sample and recruit participants other than only students.
Since participant-jurors were college students, it was evident that the verdict
preferences they indicated would not impact the defendant. Similarly, the study took
place in a campus research lab (vs. a simulated or real courtroom) and participant-jurors
were presented with a written trial transcript and instructions (vs. live or videotaped).
With the mention of these limitations, it is important to note that trial medium (e.g.
written transcript or summary, audio or video) infrequently interacts with trial-related
independent variables in juror decision-making experiments (Bornstein, 1999; Pezdek,
Avila-Mora & Sperry; Leippe et al, 2017).
Participants in the present study indicated verdict preferences individually and did
not deliberate, a methodological omission some researchers deem to be a flaw in mockjuror research. It can be observed, however, that individual pre-deliberation verdict
distributions are good predictors of deliberated verdicts (Bray & Kerr, 1979; Hastie,
1993; Leippe et al., 2017). Furthermore, mock-juror research, inclusive of deliberation
conditions or not, allows for experimental control that it not feasible outside of a lab, and
provides researchers with the opportunity to compare verdict preferences across a variety
of conditions. Mock-juror research, such as the presented study, while limited, serves an
essential role in legal research.
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Conclusion
The current study found that in the two-verdict condition, defendant group status
did not yield a significant difference of proportions of preference for guilt for the primary
charge, as little to no discrimination, in either direction, was observed. In the threeverdict condition, participant-jurors did not yield higher rates of conviction compared to
the two-verdict condition, however, a reverse discrimination effect was observed for
proportions of guilt for the primary charge, as only outgroup defendants saw a significant
decrease of convictions for second-degree murder.

Similarly, a trend of reverse

discrimination was found in the ratings of strength of evidence for the defendant’s guilt.
The Black Sheep Effect, or participant-jurors’ intention to appear politically correct,
could both serve as possible explanations for the finding of reverse discrimination and the
shift from the primary to the lesser charge for outgroup defendants only.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Informed Consent
THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
John Jay College of Criminal Justice
Department of Psychology
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY
Title of Research Study: Verdict Options and Defendant Group Status as Determinants
of Participant-Juror Verdict Preferences
Principal Investigator:

Brittany DeCesare
B.A. Psychology
B.S. Community & Justice
M.A. Student, John Jay College of Criminal Justice

Faculty Advisor:

Dr. Michael R. Leippe
B.A., M.A., Ph.D.
Professor, John Jay College of Criminal Justice
Department of Psychology

You are being asked to participate in a research study because you are an undergraduate
student at John Jay College of Criminal Justice.
Purpose:
The purpose of this research study is to gain insight about how individuals evaluate and
think about court cases, as well as the relationships between their evaluations and other
qualities and experiences.
Procedures:
If you volunteer to participate in this research study, we will ask you to do the following:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Show your student ID to confirm participation.
Complete a demographic questionnaire prior to the commencement of the study.
Read instructions and a trial transcript on a computer screen, in the program
MediaLab. This should take approximately 35-40 minutes.
Complete brief self-report dependent measures in regards to content from the trial
transcript. This should take approximately 5 minutes.
Read a debrief form post-completion of the study.
All aspects of the procedure will take place in a research lab on John Jay
College’s Campus, more specifically room 10.68.
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Time Commitment:
Your participation in this research study is expected to last for a total of one hour.
Potential Risks or Discomforts:
The foreseeable risks of participation in this study are minimal and include possible
discomfort from reading aspects of the case and answering questions. In order to
minimize these risks, we will provide you the option of stopping your participation if the
information should cause discomfort.
Potential Benefits:
A possible benefit of participation is that your knowledge about how you interpret and
judge a legal case will be enhanced. The research may benefit society and science by
contributing knowledge about the process of legal decision-making. The potential
benefits to society are increased knowledge about how the legal system works through
greater understanding psychological processes of legal decision-making.
Alternatives to Participation:
The alternative to participation is not to participate.
Payment for Participation:
You will receive academic course extra credit for participation in this research study.
New Information:
You will be notified about any new information regarding this study that may affect your
willingness to participate in a timely manner.
Confidentiality:
We will make our best efforts to maintain confidentiality of any information that is
collected during this research study, and that can identify you. We will disclose this
information only with your permission or as required by law.
We will protect your confidentiality by ensuring information gathered from you will be
coded and stored on a computer and will not in any way be connected with your name,
specific data or results, thus guaranteeing the anonymity of your participation.
Anonymity will be maintained by the use of code numbers that will make it unnecessary
to place any identifying information on any of the data you provide.
The research team, authorized CUNY staff and government agencies that oversee this
type of research may have access to research data and records in order to monitor the
research. Research records provided to authorized, non-CUNY individuals will not
contain identifiable information about you. Publications and/or presentations that result
from this study will not identify you by name.
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Participants’ Rights:
Your participation in this research study is entirely voluntary. If you decide not to
participate, there will be no penalty to you, and you will not lose any benefits to which
you are otherwise entitled.
Your participation or non-participation in this study will in no way affect your grades,
your academic standing with CUNY, or any other status in the College.
You can decide to withdraw your consent and stop participating in the research at any
time, without any penalty. If you decide not to participate, your decision will not affect
your relationship with John Jay College or the Department of Psychology at John Jay.
Questions, Comments or Concerns:
If you have any questions, comments or concerns about the research, you can talk to one
of the following researchers:
Brittany
DeCesare,
Principal
Investigator,
by
means
of
e-mail:
brittany.decesare@jjay.cuny.edu or Dr. Michael R. Leippe, Faculty Advisor, by means of
e-mail: mleippe@jjay.cuny.edu.
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, or you have comments
or concerns that you would like to discuss with someone other than the researchers,
please call the CUNY Research Compliance Administrator at 646-664-8918. Alternately,
you can write to:
CUNY Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research
Attn: Research Compliance Administrator
205 East 42nd Street
New York, NY 10017
Signature of Participant:
If you agree to participate in this research study, please sign and date below. You will be
given a copy of this consent form to keep.
_____________________________________________________
Printed Name of Participant
_____________________________________________________
Signature of Participant

__________________________
Date

____________________________________________________
Printed Name of Individual Obtaining Consent
_____________________________________________________
Signature of Individual Obtaining Consent

___________________________
Date
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Appendix B: Demographic Questionnaire
P _____
We would appreciate if you would provide some demographic information.
1) Please indicate your age: _____ years
2) Please circle your gender:
Female

Male

3) Please circle the ethnic/racial group you most identify with:
White

African American

Hispanic

Asian

Other
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Appendix C: Department of Justice Instructions
This study is a part of a research program sponsored by the United States
Department of Justice (DOJ) and examines reasoning and decision-making by adults who
are eligible to serve as jurors. The goal of the program is to understand the thought
processes that lead people to make accurate or inaccurate verdict judgments. The
involvement of the DOJ makes it highly likely these research findings with have a realworld impact. Therefore, is it important that you consider the case very carefully and
objectively.
The transcript you will read comes from a real criminal case; we will be able to
compare your verdict against that of the original jury. In addition, due to information
discovered after the actual trial, we know with certainty whether the defendant was in
fact guilty or innocent. Therefore, we will know whether your personal verdict decision
is the correct one, and be able to examine your decision-making and explanation for signs
of what led you to a correct or incorrect verdict preference. This will give us valuable
insight into the decision-making process of jurors.
Please now read and consider the following transcript carefully.
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Appendix D: Judge’s Preliminary Instructions
Judge’s Instructions (Preliminary): Two-Verdict AND Three-Verdict Condition
(Judge):
Members of the jury, we are about to begin the trial of the case of the People of the State
of New York v. (Defendant Name). The People of New York charge (Defendant Name)
with Murder in the Second Degree, the Felony Murder of Victim Name.
Under our law, a person is guilty of Felony Murder when, a person who, with intent to
cause the death of another person, causes the death of such person or of a third person, a
class A-I felony. If found guilty, the defendant faces a penalty of a minimum of 15 years
in prison.
Intent, a term used in this definition, has its own special meaning in our law. A person
engages in conduct “intentionally” if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious
object to do so.
The law uses the term, "proof beyond a reasonable doubt," to tell you how convincing the
evidence of guilt must be to permit a verdict of guilty. A reasonable doubt is an honest
doubt of the defendant's guilt for which a reason exists based upon the nature and quality
of the evidence. It is an actual doubt, not an imaginary doubt. It is a doubt that a
reasonable person, acting in a matter of this importance, would be likely to entertain
because of the evidence that was presented or because of the lack of convincing evidence.
Proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you so firmly convinced of
the defendant's guilt that you have no reasonable doubt of the existence of any element of
the crime or of the defendant's identity as the person who committed the crime.
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Appendix E: Judge’s Final Instructions (Condition Specific)
Judge’s Instructions (Final): Condition-Specific
Two-Verdict Condition:
(Judge):
You have had an opportunity to hear all of the witnesses. It is now your job to decide
how believable each witness was in his or her testimony. You are the sole judges of the
credibility of each witness and of the importance of his or her testimony.
Before you provide your verdict, I want to define the elements of the charge against the
defendant. The State has charged the defendant with Felony Murder, a Second Degree
Murder offense. Under our law, a person is guilty of Felony Murder when, a person who,
with intent to cause the death of another person, causes the death of such person or of a
third person, a class A-I felony. If found guilty, the defendant faces a penalty of a
minimum of 15 years in prison.
Please note that the defense does not formally deny that the intentional murder of Victim
Name occurred. Rather, it contends that (Defendant Name) committed no crime. Hence,
your verdict alternatives are two: Guilty as charged of second-degree murder or not
guilty. It is your task to decide on the basis of the evidence presented in this trial.
I remind you, members of the jury, that by the laws of this state, the burden of proof is
not upon the defendant to prove his or her innocence, but on the contrary, the burden of
proof is on the prosecution to convince you beyond any reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime.
Three-Verdict Condition:
(Judge):
You have had an opportunity to hear all of the witnesses. It is now your job to decide
how believable each witness was in his or her testimony. You are the sole judges of the
credibility of each witness and of the importance of his or her testimony.
I am submitting for your consideration the offense of Voluntary Manslaughter, which
was not mentioned at the beginning of the trial.
That crime is called a lesser included offense of Second-Degree Murder. As a result, our
law requires that the jury consider Second-Degree Murder and Voluntary Manslaughter
as follows:
You can find the defendant not guilty of both charges, or guilty of one of the two charges.
Thus, you will consider Second-Degree murder and render a verdict of guilty or not
guilty. If your verdict is guilty, you will not consider Voluntary Manslaughter. If your
verdict is not guilty, then you will consider Voluntary Manslaughter.
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Before you provide your verdict, I want to define the elements of the charge against the
defendant. The State has charged the defendant with Felony Murder, a Second Degree
Murder offense. Under our law, a person is guilty of Felony Murder when, a person who,
with intent to cause the death of another person, causes the death of such person or of a
third person, a class A-I felony. If found guilty, the defendant faces a penalty of a
minimum of 15 years in prison.
Under our law, a person is guilty of Felony Voluntary Manslaughter when, a person who,
with intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, causes the death of such
person or third person, a class B felony. If found guilty, the defendant faces a penalty of
a minimum of 5 years in prison.
Section 10.00(10) of the Penal Code defines “serious physical injury” as physical injury
which “creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes death or serious and protracted
disfigurement, protracted impairment of health or protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily organ.”
Intent, a term used in both definitions, has its own special meaning in our law. A person
engages in conduct “intentionally” if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious
object to do so.
The difference of intent is a mitigating factor that reduces what otherwise would be
Second-Degree Murder to Voluntary Manslaughter.
Please note that the defense does not formally deny that the intentional murder of Victim
Name occurred. Rather, it contends that (Defendant Name) committed no crime. Hence,
your verdict alternatives are three: Guilty as charged of second-degree murder, guilty of
voluntary manslaughter or not guilty. It is your task to decide on the basis of the
evidence presented in this trial.
I remind you, members of the jury, that by the laws of this state, the burden of proof is
not upon the defendant to prove his or her innocence, but on the contrary, the burden of
proof is on the prosecution to convince you beyond any reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime.
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Appendix F: Verdict Preferences Dependent Measures
Two-Verdict Condition:
1) As a juror in this case, please indicate the verdict you prefer:
Guilty
Not Guilty
2) How certain are you of this verdict? (1 = Extremely uncertain, 11 = Extremely certain)
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

3) What is the likelihood that the defendant is guilty of the crime he was tried for
(Second-degree murder)? Please provide your percentage below.
The likelihood is ______ % that the defendant is guilty of the crime he was tried for.
4) Overall, how STRONG is the evidence AGAINST the defendant? (1 = Not at all
Strong, 11 = Extremely Strong)
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

5) Overall, how STRONG is the evidence of the defendant’s INNOCENCE? (1 = Not at
all Strong, 11 = Extremely Strong)
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

Three-Verdict Condition:
1) As a juror in this case, please indicate the verdict you prefer:
Guilty: Second-degree murder
Guilty: Voluntary manslaughter
Not Guilty
2) How certain are you of this verdict? (1 = Extremely uncertain, 11 = Extremely certain)
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

3) What is the likelihood that the defendant is guilty of SECOND-DEGREE MURDER?
Please provide your percentage below.
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The likelihood is ______ % that the defendant is guilty of second-degree murder.
4) Overall, how STRONG is the evidence AGAINST the defendant for the crime of
SECOND-DEGREE MURDER? (1 = Not at all Strong, 11 = Extremely Strong)
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

5) Overall, how STRONG is the evidence of the defendant’s INNOCENCE for the crime
of SECOND-DEGREE MURDER? (1 = Not at all Strong, 11 = Extremely Strong)
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

6) What is the likelihood that the defendant is guilty of VOLUNTARY
MANSLAUGHTER? Please provide your percentage below.
The likelihood is ______ % that the defendant is guilty of voluntary manslaughter.
7) Overall, how STRONG is the evidence AGAINST the defendant for the crime of
VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER? (1 = Not at all Strong, 11 = Extremely Strong)
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

8) Overall, how STRONG is the evidence of the defendant’s INNOCENCE for the crime
of VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER? (1 = Not at all Strong, 11 = Extremely Strong)
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

9) Please list the reasons for the verdict you provided, either guilty of second-degree
murder, guilty of voluntary manslaughter or not guilty.
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Appendix G: Manipulation Check
1) What was the race of the defendant in the trial transcript? Please circle your response.
White

African American

Hispanic

Asian

Other
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Appendix H: Debrief Form
Debriefing: Mock-Juror’s Responses to a Court Case Study
The study you just completed is related to how mock-jurors generate decisions in
a murder trial and some of the factors that might influence their verdict decisions.
In this study, participants were lead to believe that the trial transcript they read
was that of an actual case and that the verdict from the actual jury, in tandem with the
actual guilt or innocence of the defendant, was known. As a participant, you were also
informed that the study was interested in whether you could determine the “correct
verdict,” therefore, it was imperative to read the transcript carefully. In truth, the trial
transcript was not a real case. As experimenters, we apologize for the deception. The
intention behind the deception was to get you to believe that the case was real and that
the outcomes were known so that your motivation to carefully read the transcript and
evaluate the presented case information was increased. Previous research has revealed
that informing participants that their accuracy as decision-makers as the focus of the
study compelled them to evaluate the case information more carefully and diligently than
they would in absence of this information. Due to this insight from past studies, this
study aimed to increase motivation within the participants to carefully evaluate the
evidence of the case.
In regards to the trial, one of the independent variables of the study was the race
or ethnicity of the defendant. Depending on the case condition in which you were
randomly assigned to, the defendant was Black, Hispanic or non-Hispanic White.
Judgments of evidence are often influenced by stereotypes and opinions of racial and
ethnic groups. One of the interests of this study was to examine whether the effects of
race/ethnicity are demonstrated when jurors evaluate evidence when the motivation to
study the case is high. A second independent variable of the study was the verdict
options available to the juror. Depending on the case condition in which you were
randomly assigned to, the verdict options were the traditional two dichotomous options of
guilty or not guilty or the traditional two with the addition of a lesser charge verdict,
more specifically, voluntary manslaughter.
We will be examining the certainty of your rendered verdict as well as your
perceived likelihood that the defendant was guilty of the crime he was tried for. These
measures were included to help us explore the possible relationships between these
individual factors and how they might affect the verdict jurors’ reach in a case. The
results of this study may provide contributions to resolving contemporary debates
regarding jury decision-making in the criminal justice system as well as contribute to
decisions about policies and procedures. For example, what we find out about judge’s
statements regarding bias could prove useful to decisions about revising jury instructions.
This study is being conducted under the supervision of Dr. Michael Leippe. If
you want to talk with him in regards to this study, he can be contacted at
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mleippe@jjay.cuny.edu. Similarly if you would like to a report of the results once the
study is completed, Dr. Leippe would be happy to send you one upon request.
We remind you that once you leave this study, no records will be kept which
connect your name to specific data results, thus guaranteeing the confidentiality of your
participation.
Now, it is very important that you agree to the following request: Please DO NOT
discuss this research with anyone who might be a participant in the research in the next
few months. We will continue to run this study throughout the year and it will be invalid
if participants attend with prior knowledge or preconceptions about it. Thank you very
much for your cooperation and participation!

